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WILL **THE SPRING** COME AGAIN?

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abstract

THREE PROCESSES ARE CENTRAL TO UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE EARLY PROMISE OF THE ARAB SPRING, AND ITS TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS FIVE YEARS LATER: (1) COUNTER-REVOLUTION: UNDERTAKEN BY THE INTERESTS THAT BENEFITED FROM THE OLD REGIMES, AND THAT SOUGHT TO KEEP IN PLACE AS MUCH OF THE OLD ORDER AS POSSIBLE. (2) MILITARIZATION: WHAT HAD BEGUN AS PEACEFUL PROTEST SURROUNDED BY GREAT LOCAL MAJORITIES, GAVE RISE TO A SCENE IN WHICH NO FACTION COULD RELIABLY CLAIM TO REPRESENT "THE PEOPLE" AS A WHOLE. (3) GEOPOLITICS: WHAT BEGAN AS POPULAR, INDIGENOUS PROTESTS IN WHICH NO EXTERNAL POWER HAD ANY ROLE, GRADUALLY TURNED INTO INTERNATIONAL CRISES, IN WHICH KEY DECISIONS WERE ONCE AGAIN IN THE HANDS OF GEOPOLITICAL ACTORS, AND NO LONGER IN THE HANDS OF POPULAR MOVEMENTS. THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THE ORIGINS AND DYNAMICS OF THESE THREE FACTORS, AND ENDS BY ARGUING THAT LOOKING AT CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION

BEHIND THE CURRENT FAÇADE OF ARAB POLITICS, IS KEY TO APPRECIATING THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF THE ARAB SPRING.

ARAB SPRING, REVOLUTION, CIVIL WAR, GEOPOLITICS

keywords

THOSE WHO JOIN REVOLUTIONS SUDDENLY AND IN LARGE NUMBERS TEND TO EXPECT THEM TO BE SHORT EPISODES THAT WILL DELIVER UTOPIAN RESULTS. IN REALITY, REVOLUTIONS TEND TO BECOME LONG PROCESSES WITH INCREASING COMPLEXITY. THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAKE REVOLUTIONS ALWAYS SEEM DISAPPOINTING, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THAT THEY ARE UNLEASHED BY EXPECTATIONS OF QUICK DELIVERANCE, AND AN IDEOLOGY OF SIMPLE, EVIDENT TRUTH.

Now we know that the Arab revolutions that began during the last days of 2010 will be no exception to this general rule. The reasons are many: firstly, the interests that benefited from the old regimes fought back, as one would expect, to keep in place as much of the old order as possible. This is what we typically call the 'counter-revolution;' secondly, what began as peaceful protest everywhere, apparently surrounded by great local majorities, was in many cases replaced by a violent civil war in which no faction could reliably claim to represent 'the people' as a whole, the original agent of the uprisings; and thirdly, what began as popular, indigenous protests in which no external power had any role gradually turned into international crises in which key decisions were once again in the hands of geopolitical actors, and no longer in the hands of popular movements.

All of the above is part of the character of the current scene, five years after the beginning of a new era in modern Arab history. I would like to devote this article to describing how these three dynamics emerged, but suggest at the end that what I had once described as "the Arab dark age (1973-2011)" is actually over. Not because bad things do not happen, nor because the revolutions will reach their destination soon. Rather, the dark age is over because of a new social dynamism in Arab culture that cannot be detected if we focus entirely on the dismal political scene.

The tendency of revolutions to reach generally acceptable destinations (not utopia) in the long-run is rooted in the fact that revolutions change the culture of those who had experienced them long before they change any real politics. Long-term change, after all, can only be based on cultural

change, not on occasional change of the instruments of power. Indeed, it can be said that the very last thing that a revolution changes in any society is its political structures.

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION

The counter-revolution had its roots in the revolution itself. Since the Arab Uprisings possessed neither centralized leadership nor centralized organization, they found themselves relying on the 'clean part' of the old regime to finish the revolution on their behalf. The fact that part of the old regime was expected to complete the revolution may seem strange, but is not uncommon in revolutionary history generally, and in Arab conditions it has been the pattern everywhere. In Tunisia, the first post-Ben Ali government was led by members of the old regime, just as was the case in Egypt shortly after, as well as Yemen. Even in Libya, where the former regime was destroyed more substantially than anywhere else, the first revolutionary leadership, the National Transitional Council, consisted to a large extent of formerly high-ranking members of the old regime, including a substantial number of ambassadors. To gain perspective, we may compare these Arab revolutionary conditions to the more classical Iranian Revolution three decades earlier, which witnessed about 20,000 executions in its first two years – that is, an effective destruction of the old regime in its entirety. This of course is not to say that the Iranian Revolution was better. The point is to highlight the contrast, which helps us understand the origin of the counter-revolution in the current Arab setting.



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But the point above needs a qualification: structural issues alone, such as the lack of either identifiable revolutionary leadership or common organization, do not necessarily mean that the clean part of the old regime would be expected to finish the revolution. That expectation was there only because a substantial part of the Arab Uprisings consisted of a reformist wing that lived well with the notion that the old regime contained a reformed wing that could be relied upon for the task. The size of this wing is evident in the first post-uprising referenda and elections in Tunisia and Egypt, which, because generally open and eliciting of relatively large participation rates, may serve as good barometers of the popular sentiment of those moments. In both countries, the winners, both Islamists and secular liberals, tended to be those who were more keen on reforming the old state than overthrowing

it in its entirety. In the first round of the Egyptian presidential elections in 2012, the 76% of the vote that went to candidates identifying with various wings of the Egyptian Revolution consisted of two camps almost equal in size. Hamdeen Sabahi and Abdul Moneim Abu al-Futuh, representing then the more radical wing of the revolution, gained together 40% of the vote, just slightly more than the combined total of the revolution's more reformist wing, represented by Mohammed Morsi and Amr Musa.¹

While the Arab Uprisings were anarchist in their method, they contained a substantial reformist wing.² This reality meant that an eventual counter-revolution did not need to go through the laborious process of mobilizing forces marginalized by the revolution. Rather, the counter-revolution could simply gather itself within existing state structures, since those were never destroyed, and gain momentum at the first signs of trouble or disaffection, inevitable as these are in any post-revolutionary period.

The counter-revolution is not simply old regime personnel taking over again. Much more seriously, it is a set of counter-revolutionary ideas that are disseminated among the populace and are clearly intended to delegitimize the spirit, thoughts, art, hopes, and experiences of the revolution. These ideas are designed to persuade the populace that while some reform may be needed, the revolution itself was a mistake. Egypt, where the counter-revolutionary project has advanced furthest, also provides the clearest example of how the counter-revolution consists not merely of institutions, namely those of the old regime such as the military, security forces, much of the judiciary, and the entire deep state, but also of a set of ideas.

Elsewhere, I outlined three main ideas that form the core of the ideological arsenal of the counter-revolution³: Firstly, the displacement of the role of the 'ordinary person' experienced during the revolution by the notion of a 'savior leader' as the real maker of history (See no. 1 in Figure 1); Secondly, the denigration of 'peoplehood' from one of a noble creator of new reality and an ultimate source of legitimacy to one of a mass defined largely by its ignorance and savagery, and thus in need of a strong protective hand (2); and finally, changing the meaning of 'realism' away from any revolutionary associations, outlining it only as a posture that shows the error of the revolution, rather than as an approach to systematic change (3).

¹ I should clarify that when I speak of the "forces of the revolution" here, I refer to all actors who took part in it; the fact that those actors joined for different reasons and ended up in mortal conflicts with each other does not change that original reality. Mass revolts are never homogenous bodies, even if they are imagined to be such by their advocates.

² For a more detailed analysis of the tension between anarchism as style and liberalism as ideology in these uprisings, see: Bamyeh 2013: 188-202.

³ Bamyeh 2014.

Figure 1. Core Ideological Propositions of the Counter-Revolution

PROPOSITIONS OF		REVOLUTION	COUNTER-REVOLUTION
1	MAKER OF HISTORY	THE ORDINARY PERSON	THE SAVIOUR LEADER
2	MENTAL CHARACTER OF "THE PEOPLE"	ENLIGHTENED	IGNORANT
3	MEANING OF "REALISM"	GRADUAL CHANGE TOWARD ULTIMATE REVOLUTIONARY GOALS	REJECTING REVOLUTIONARY GOALS

MILITARIZATION

The violent conditions that have emerged after the original uprisings in Syria, Yemen, and Libya have made us forget the relatively peaceful few months with which the Arab Spring had begun. Yet that early peaceful phase must be counted as representing the demographic essence of the uprisings, since it was the only period in which such an abstraction as 'the people' could be seen to be acting as a concrete entity. Why did the uprisings take on a military or violent turn in these cases? When did the violent turn begin? And what are its consequences?

After the two early successes of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, other vulnerable Arab regimes began to consider new strategies of survival. The eight weeks witnessing the collapse of those two regimes (December 17, 2010 to February 11, 2011), was an intense learning period: the clear lesson was that the old Arab order could not survive a relatively peaceful (and likely for that reason unified) popular movement. The next logical old regimes' option was to seek survival through a divisive civil war. The main evidence that this was the new survival strategy was that it was put into practice against similar uprising in other countries following February 11: later in February 2011 in Libya, and less than a month later in Yemen and Syria.

In other countries, we saw a modified version of the civil war plan, with the underlying logic being the same: to transform a mass popular movement into something divisive, that is, to anything other than an expression of unified peoplehood. In Bahrain, the protest movement gradually transformed from a mass national movement into a sectarian conflict, just a step short of civil war. In that case, the transformation was a result of both a calculated regime strategy and an outcome of the presence on the scene of a strong factional party, Wifāq [Concord], that had widely been regarded as a vehicle for Shi'a demands. The Bahraini equation was

eventually 'resolved' with a foreign invasion that provided a weak local regime with the functional equivalent of a civil war it could not fight on its own. In other countries, such as Jordan, Morocco or Oman, the regimes faced popular movements that were less insistent on regime overthrow, and thus those regimes never had to engage the civil war scenario.

“

GENOCIDE IN LIBYA WAS LIKELY AVERTED

But in its basic logic the Bahraini case was similar to obvious attempts elsewhere by the old order to generate civil wars. In Yemen, several deadly attacks on the protestors in Taghyir Square were clearly intended to compel the peaceful occupation into violent reaction. The split of the armed forces, however, weakened the regime's ability to proceed with a civil war scenario, although it did not dampen its resolve to engineer a civil war after it had abdicated the office of the presidency about a year later.

In Libya, the violent turn was almost immediate, but even here it is forgotten that the Libyan uprising, too, had a few early peaceful days, notably in Benghazi, and that the militarization of the opposition depended on local capacities, was clearly amateurish, and lacked central command. In Syria, the disastrous consequences of the regime's early decision to methodically meet peaceful demonstrations with deadly violence are obvious today. However, it is forgotten that the Syrian uprising took several months before becoming militarized. Between March and early September of 2011, the Syrian revolution was largely peaceful, and most violence was exercised unilaterally by the regime, as was the case in Tunisia during the four weeks between the beginning of the mass protests and the ousting of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. In Libya, by contrast, the peaceful phase, which began on February 21, 2011, lasted less than a week. In all cases, the dynamics resulting in militarization of conflict were initiated by the regime. The old Arab regimes were less concerned about the specter of civil war than about their own downfall. In Syria, this preference for civil war was spelled out in the streets by the regime's supporters' explicit forewarning that they were prepared to torch the country should calls Asad's removal persist.

The same applies to Libya, where the first reaction to the protest was a speech by Muammar Qaddafi's son, Sayf al-Islam, followed by one by Qaddafi himself, both consisting of explicit genocidal threats against the opposition. Here, the proposition that a genocide in Libya was likely averted must be part of the analysis when we assess the various critiques of the Western intervention there. These critiques⁴ were based either on a principled rejection of foreign intervention or the opposite point of view

4 For example, Forte 2011.

– namely that the intervention was not sufficient or sustained enough to prevent ungovernability and chaos after the fall of the old regime. Typically, critics of the NATO intervention in Libya argue that there was no ‘empirical’ or ‘specific’ proof that genocide was imminent. Strangely, they ignore the clearest empirical proof, namely Qaddafi’s own explicit threats to exterminate his enemies and his dehumanization of them, all enunciated in his speech on February 22, 2011, as his forces, led by his sons, were poised for the task.⁵

In any case, the militarization of the uprisings, wherever that was the case, changed the latter’s course and nature. First, the militarized opposition could not count on popular unanimity of support, as appeared to be the case during the peaceful phases, since by its nature militarization excluded the large portion of the original opposition that did not wish to be part of a more violent phase. Second, while the number of willing participants in the military phase was far smaller than the number of peaceful protesters, peaceful protest dwindled into insignificance after the beginning of the military phase, even though militarization originally appeared to promise quick salvation. Third, militarization involved more hierarchical structures than was needed for the peaceful phase. The peaceful phase had required less control, discipline, and even coordination than the military phase did, and relied on spontaneous action, individual initiative, and relative freedom from organizations and group constraints. Fourth, militarization raised more concerns about the nature of the post-revolutionary period for everyone involved, since it became increasingly evident that if a regime was to lose the war, the post-revolutionary order would likely be determined by the best positioned military contingent of the revolution, rather than by a unified peoplehood, as presaged during the peaceful phase.

In every respect, therefore, militarization did alter the dynamics of the uprisings, with the eventual result being the enhancement of the role of factors other than those of united peoplehood – the original demographic material of the uprisings. The most important of these other factors was geopolitics.

GEOPOLITICS

Until they cross borders, civil wars in important world regions tend to become global wars played out on confined territory. That was the case of

⁵ I am not arguing that NATO’s intervention was altruistic, but it appears to have been the result of calculations, notably on the part of then French president Nicolas Sarkozy, that the West must make an attempt to insert itself as a friendly force on the side of the agents of regional change that was already underway. The fact that Western powers were ill-prepared for the aftermath and had no clear strategy as to what to do in case the transition in Libya proved more difficult than originally anticipated does not invalidate this proposition.

Lebanon, whose long civil war (1975- 1991) lasted so long precisely because it had become a war among regional states and large powers, played out on Lebanese territory. That meant that the war could end only when the large geopolitical actors involved agreed on a formula for its resolution. The same has been happening to Syria since 2011, although it is also the case in Yemen and Libya now.

In all these cases, local militias and competing local governments all have external backers. As in the earlier case of Lebanon, a settlement now requires not only the exhaustion of the local actors, which eventually happens in all civil wars that reach a stalemate, but also an agreement by geopolitical actors on a compromise formula. Since those who are likely to design this formula are not “the people” who had started the uprising, “the people” will be treated as mere spectators to a resolution that will be distant from their original hopes.

The return of geopolitics means that while the conflicts began with popular movements, they are ultimately resolved by actors that have little interest in such movements. This is easy to show. The Syrian uprising, like all other Arab Uprisings of 2011, called for a civic state, citizenship rights, end of corruption, popular will, and universal democracy. Yet it was supported by Saudi Arabia, the most reactionary force in the Arab World, and the regime that at its core is the expressed enemy of all such values. As we know, the Saudi support for the uprising was based not on love for what it stood for, but because the Saudi regime saw the uprising entirely from the point of view of geopolitics: as an opportunity to weaken Iran, upon which the Saudi regime fixates as its main nemesis.

In Yemen, the positions are reversed, but the principle is the same: the Iranian leadership saw the Yemeni uprising merely as an opportunity to extend its regional influence, and never in the civic terms that had ignited it and kept it going until the departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh. In Libya, the country has become so fractured not merely due to internal dynamics, but because those dynamics have been magnified manifold by external geopolitics. The military regime in Egypt assesses the Libyan situation only in terms of its own conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus supports – along with the UAE – one government, while other regional actors support the other government or local militias, thus insuring that local reconciliation would require geopolitical reconciliation.

Geopolitics, therefore, cannot be regarded as a helpful factor, even when diplomacy succeeds. Regional powers may eventually help resolve the crises in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, but then they would be only resolving crises that they themselves had magnified. The expansion of the so-called Islamic State may be traced not to its ideology, but to the fact that it is resolutely independent of all actors, and thus remains unsullied by any external or

geopolitical games – even though it could scarcely claim to speak on behalf of ‘the people’.

The greatest shift caused by the return of geopolitics to the dynamics of the Arab Spring consists in taking the initiative, once again, away from popular movements. The most significant sociological fact of 2011 concerned the degree to which popular initiatives from below pulled the rug from underneath all geopolitical actors, as well as from the organized opposition in all countries. For a brief moment, it appeared that the mightiest powers had little influence on the course of events, that the most important authorities that had so thoroughly controlled the lot of their people had suddenly become helpless and clueless when facing a determined and relatively unified peoplehood. In a sense, the brief triumph of peoplehood over geopolitics can be traced to the early sociological character of the Arab Spring itself, as a headless movement that resisted being encapsulated by any authorities.⁶

REVOLUTION IN THE LONG RUN

The three developments summed up above may have the effect of producing a sense of hopelessness. However, taken together they suggest that the Arab Uprisings possess similar features to those accompanying long term, historical revolutions. A counter-revolution is always to be expected given the size and power of the interests invested in the old regimes. Likewise, geopolitics always comes to play a role when revolutions last long enough for neighboring states and concerned external powers to devise strategies to deal with them. Neighboring states and external powers cannot be expected to remain inactive in the face of popular revolutions; it is to be expected that they will seek to channel popular energy in a direction that serves their own interests, however they define it. And while militarization is not an inevitable prospect, we see it in this case to be an outcome of those two other processes. But militarization is a symptom of the decay of the old order, not simply a symptom of misguided popular energies. Viewing rebellion mainly as a security threat above all else is a sign of what I had

⁶ Indeed, the earliest attempts by Arab regimes to discredit the uprisings consisted of claims that they were the work of ‘foreign elements,’ in the words of Mubarak’s vice president Omar Suleiman. The old regimes, in other words, wanted to see or at least portray the uprisings as anything but a popular movement. This standpoint was obviously intended to discredit the uprisings. At the same time, it corresponded to the old regimes’ familiar world image: that the world was designed everywhere by men of power; and that the abstraction called ‘the people’ had no voice in that grand theatre, except as spectator. Rulers knew how to deal with each other, and the Machiavellian handbook contained the instructions they all knew. It was much easier for them to follow such rules than to deal with popular movements that were unpredictable and had their own rulers. Geopolitics therefore could live well with the counter-revolution, since both processes contained the same basic elements.



SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONS ALWAYS CHANGE
THE CULTURE BEFORE THEY ARE ABLE TO
CHANGE THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

originally called “autocratic deafness,”⁷ namely the incapacity of the old regimes to hear protest other than as undifferentiated noise, and thus as a source of generalized existential threat.

Today, five years after the beginning salvos of the Arab Spring, the old order seems to be entrenched still. With very measured exceptions like Tunisia, none of the grievances associated with the uprisings have been met, and in Egypt, the counter-revolutionary regime seems to have learned only that the revolution had happened because not enough repression was used. The intellectual mediocrity of the counter-revolutionary governments, so evident in a sequence of embarrassing public statements, and frequent government reshuffles since General Sisi’s ascension to power, is part of a larger Zeitgeist that characterizes the whole scene of the Arab counter-revolution: a conservative-defensive posture that is entirely focused on regime survival, rather than on addressing any of the grievances that were at the heart of the uprising. Nowhere do we see a genuine plan for more representative or participatory governance, no plan at all for catering to the future of the huge populations of unemployed but more politically conscious youth, zero interest in combatting corruption, which feeds the old elites, and a complete lack of imagination when it comes to regional and global issues, which are completely reduced to a calculus of security threats. It is hard to imagine how an order so wretched can meet any of the challenges of the twenty first century. Which is another way of saying: another spring will eventually come. It may be less spectacular in appearance than the spring of 2011, or more focused in its ideology, or differently organized. But the ground material for it has already been laid down in the slow moving cultural transformations that have begun in 2011.

Ultimate hope resides not in a military victory of the opposition over the regime, or one wing of it over other wings. In none of these cases one can speak of a triumph of ‘popular will,’ only of the triumph of the will of a specific, well-resourced, organized, and capable group.⁸ One has to look under the surface of the current noise of conflict to detect long term cultural transformations, which are the only processes by which revolutions build a lasting reservoir of new ideals.

⁷ Bamyeh 2011.

⁸ To date, Tunisia has remained the exception, even though the elections have delivered winning and losing parties. But ‘popular will,’ especially in revolutionary times, cannot be measured by election results. Rather, it is any process surrounded by relative popular consensus. In the Tunisian case, such a process was delivered through the National Dialogue Quartet, which propelled the constitutional process along, and in the process kept the country from sliding into a civil war or its equivalent.

Successful revolutions always change the culture before they are able to change the political structure so that it acquires at least a minimally credible relation to the spirit of the revolution. In the case of the Arab Spring, processes of cultural change can be seen when we study the youth: new types of intellectual activity in the public sphere and, generally, new ways of looking by ordinary individuals that highlight long-term vision over episodic change. For the youth, the revolutions were formative life experiences, whose real significance is not yet apparent. The capacity to participate in purposeful action oriented to collective social and political transformation is a relatively new experience for a large number of Arab youths, even though the ultimate lesson that will be learned from this process will not be uniform.⁹

However, for the first time in modern Arab history, we note the mobilization of a large proportion of the Arab youth in protest movements, whose primary sociological feature is their own action on behalf of change that they themselves enunciate, rather than as supporters of one organized movement or a savior leader. Other tendencies are also doubtlessly part of the equation, and they do include a fascist potential as one of the ultimate options. There is no question that the part of the demographics of current Jihadism that is traceable to Arab youth who took part in the 2011 uprisings is one part of the search for grand meaning that is always associated with witnessing a grand historical epic. Other parts of the same process are less noisy and slower in motion. The formation of debating clubs, for example, as well as virtual and physical forums for the exchange of ideas, are part of the current scene as well. The intellectual scene I have observed under the current political climate in Egypt, for example, includes a great deal of fear, as one would expect under repressive environments. But the degree to which authorities are contested by organized civil society as well as in unauthorized street protests is astonishing, precisely given the overwhelming repressive response of state authorities.

Even more demographically significant is the rise of new actors in the public sphere who would not have had any such roles under the old regimes. In Libya, for example, we hear much about the role of armed militias and the competing governments, but little about the work of the likes of Alaa Murabit, who has been establishing new networks and specifically aiming to provide more voice to marginalized groups, notably women and the youth, or the Shaghaf [infatuation] movement in Jordan, which enlists

⁹ Studies of the Arab youth are scarce, and observations that seem meaningful tend to be anecdotal. More work here is needed. However, it is important to point out models of study that are ill-advised, most famously the Arab Youth Surveys of Asda'a Burson-Marsteller. Although it received a good deal of attention, this survey suffers from what I regard to be fatal methodological flaws: the unjustified over-representation of nationals from the Gulf region; the ties of the polling company to the UAE government; and the unclear meaning of the survey questions themselves.

thousands of horizontally organized youth who seek to take part of politics outside of the official channels and in their own creative ways. This work represents the more silent cultural revolution that has accompanied the



WE HAVE MADE THE REVOLUTION FOR OUR
CHILDREN, NOT OURSELVES

Arab Spring: the rise of actors of a new type, who do not simply contest state power as much as activate new sectors of the population that have never before thought of themselves as proper carriers of political and social ideals larger than themselves. In places such as Tunisia, where political party life has been established, these new energies may be channeled into it, although political parties are not the only or necessary depositories of such new forces.

All of the above resonates with what I have been hearing, especially in my fieldwork in Egypt, from slightly older individuals than the youth segment – namely those in their 30s – who seem to be expressing what they have learned from the events of 2011: we have made the revolution for our children, not ourselves, they tend to say now. This of course is a new perspective, not one expressed by anyone back in 2011, when utopia was expected to be just around the corner. The explanations I hear about this new, long-term perspective on revolutions vary, but central to them is a belief that the revolution happens because reality requires a lot of work – indeed, the revolution could not have happened had that not been the case. What is that work? In one sense it is structural, aiming to dismantle gradually the vast power apparatus that has benefited from the old regimes and that would be expected to fight to death to defend its accumulated interests. But more significantly, the work is psychological, which seems from my observations to be a more widespread explanation: we have become too damaged because we grew up in a system so corrupt that it required a revolution.

The conclusion they draw is that it may therefore be too late for us as grown-ups to change. But our children will eventually reap the psychological benefits of the revolutions, and their culture will be different from ours. That is perhaps what one has to say when one feels that a dark age is dissipating, yet at a much slower pace than anticipated by the revolutionary imagination.

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