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REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFRICA

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article abstract

THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR IMPOSES MORE RESPONSIBILITIES ON REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY IN AFRICA THE MOTIVES FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION IN THE REGION HAVE BEEN BROADENED TO INCLUDE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE-BUILDING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. THIS ADDS CREDENCE TO THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS A DIALECTICAL UNITY OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL PROCESSES. THIS PAPER UNDERTAKES A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL REVIEW OF THE CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSES ON THE RELEVANCE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION TO DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND OTHER REGIONS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH. IT POINTS OUT THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL APPROACH TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE-BUILDING PROCESS, REVIEWS THE PERFORMANCE OF AFRICA REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE QUEST FOR PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE CONTINENT, AND ALSO HIGHLIGHTS THE INFLUENCE OF THE GLOBAL FORCES ON REGIONAL APPROACH TO PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA. DESPITE THEIR OBVIOUS SHORTCOMINGS, REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS STILL LARGELY REPRESENT PRIMARY UNITS OF SECURITY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FOR AFRICA. THE PAPER SUGGESTS FURTHER RESEARCH IS REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY AND DEFINE ISSUES MORE PRECISELY IN THE LINK BETWEEN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

keywords

REGIONAL INTEGRATION, AFRICAN UNION, SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, PEACE-BUILDING, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The management of international violence since the end of the Cold War imposes more responsibilities on regional organizations in Africa. Consequently the motives for economic cooperation and integration in the region have been broadened to include political interests and regional collective security in addition to the need for greater international bargaining power. The broadening of the role and functions of cooperation and integration schemes to include responsibility for peace-building and conflict management efforts generally adds credence to the conceptualization of regional integration as a dialectical unity of social, economic and political processes. This re-conceptualization is at the core of the current discourses about the link between regionalism and collective security. More than ever, peace and development are now intimately linked in the discourses on the role of integration schemes and regional collective security. There is indeed a growing global awareness that the pursuit of economic development by regional integration schemes is only possible under a peaceful atmosphere.

The idea of collective security is rooted in the concerns about how to prevent the abuse of power by powerful states in the international system. The classical work by Inis Claude (1971) on the development of international organizations in the twentieth century illuminates this path. His study reveals the evident preoccupation with the idea of collective security and the

"antiwar orientations" that informed the efforts to construct international organizations.[1] Thus, the League of Nations was established with the expectation that it would transcend 'politics' in its operations, and that its establishment would mark the birth of the new world order. The League however failed to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. But that in itself could not end the obsession of many statesmen with collective security. In 1945 the United Nations Organization was formed, still around the concept of collective security, with deference to the position of the realist on power politics. As Mark Zacher has put it, "statesmen now recognised that without the inclusion of the Great Powers-whose partial exclusion had, of course, contributed to the League's demise - the new organization would likely share the fate of its predecessor."[2]

> MORE THAN EVER, PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ARE NOW INTIMATELY LINKED IN THE DISCOURSES ON THE ROLE OF INTEGRATION SCHEMES AND REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY

During the discussions preceding the formation of the United Nations, there was the question on whether the new security system should be oriented toward regionalism as advocated by Moscow and London, or toward universalism as Washington favoured. A proposal was made by the Great Powers for the San Francisco Conference in June 1945 to create an international collective security organization. However, changes were made to allow regional organizations to manage conflicts between their members. This was prompted by three considerations: (1) regional approach to interstate conflicts held more promise of eliciting collaboration; (2) global rivalries and divisions might inhibit the United Nations from dealing with some types of conflicts; and (3) some countries were just not too enthusiastic about the interventions of the Great Powers in their regions.[3] Whatever the strength of these concerns, they provided, in some sense, the justification for the UN provisions in Article 51-54. It was partly in response to this provision that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963 as the collective regional security apparatus for Africa. In 2002 the African Union (AU) replaced the OAU. Between the OAU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) many sub-regional integration schemes were 'midwifed 'into existence but initially for economic purposes.

1 Claude 1971: 216.
2 Zacher 1979: 2.
3 Zacher 1979: 2.

This paper briefly undertakes a conceptual and theoretical review of the classical and contemporary discourses on the relevance of regional integration to development in Africa and other regions in the global South. Also, it points out the growing importance of a regional approach to conflict management and peace-building process in Africa. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section introduces the main issues, while the second section presents an overview of conceptual and theoretical issues of regional integration, and looks at the re-conceptualization of African regional integration process to accommodate concerns for peace and development, and the appreciation of a regional approach to conflict prevention and peace processes. In the third section the paper highlights the influence of the global forces in terms of pressures on and opportunities for the development of regional approach to peace and development in Africa. The fourth section concludes the paper with suggestions and recommendations for further research on regional approaches to the promotion of peace and stability in Africa.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Integration simply means bringing parts or units together to form a whole or creating interdependence. Integration can be said to exist when units join together in order to satisfy objectives which they cannot meet autonomously. In this way, integration can be a process that hastens up the achievement of certain objectives in the interest of a larger body. This process involves the shifting of loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger centre whose institutions and processes demand some jurisdiction over those of the national states. The extent of such transfer of loyalties and jurisdiction enjoyed by the new centre depends on the level and goals of integration schemes as well as the socio-economic and political ramifications, which the implementation of integrative policies generate within and between the integrating units. Regarding regional integration the debate among scholars continues about the meaning of 'integration' to this day. However, there seems to be an agreement on the fact that regional integration can be regarded as a process or as a state of affairs reached by that process. According to Fritz Machlup, the question as to whether that state has to be a terminal point or intermediate point in the process can be taken care of by distinguishing between 'complete' and 'incomplete' integration. The more difficult question is what is to be integrated – people, areas, markets, production, goods, resources, policies, or something else?[4]

4 Machlup 1976: 63.

Although both have often been used interchangeably, the difference between 'integration' and 'cooperation' can be observed in both qualitative and quantitative contexts. While 'cooperation' may be employed to identify loose forms of interstate activity designed to meet some commonly experienced needs, 'integration' refers to a much more formal arrangement that involves some political and economic sacrifices as well as commitments, concessions, processes and political will to redefine participation in the international economy.[5] In this regard regional cooperation may be a phase in the process of regional integration. The efficiency and effectiveness of supranational structures have become key yardsticks for measuring the performance of integrative schemes. The assumption is that where the supranational structure wields adequate powers and commands respect and loyalty of member-states, conditions for qualitative integration exist. Since the evolution of modern European integration in the 1950s there has been significant improvement in the application of the principle of supranationality. However, both in Europe and elsewhere there have been varied experiences with different levels of success. For instance, the evolution of the European Community inspired some scholars and diplomats to nurse hopes that the nation-state would wither. But even within the European Union (EU) there are developments and events that suggest that "the nation state retains a unique capacity to inspire loyalty and obedience,[6] and that states are still sentimentally attached to national sovereignty.

David Mitrany is easily acknowledged as the father of functionalism in international relations. With his early work on A Working Peace System of 1943 he pioneered modern integrative theory. The central argument in David Mitrany's theory is that international cooperation is the best way for softening antagonisms in the international environment. He therefore put forth a strong case in support of functional cooperation as the solution to the global peace problem. Mitrany saw the federalist approach, especially its European model, as a possible hindrance to peace. According to him, "The "European" federalists have been so fascinated by a readily convenient formula that they have asked how it works where it exists, nor whether its origins bear any relation to the problem of uniting a group of states in the present social ambience."[7] Instead of federation projects Mitrany recommended the establishment of functional agencies for the execution of international cooperation on all issue-related, mainly technical and economic sectors. He said this approach could eventually enmesh national governments in a dense network of

5 Axline 1977; Ihonvbere 1983.
6 Tugendhart 1985: 421.
7 Mitrany 1968: 52.

interlocking cooperative ventures. According to Mitrany, function, form and role can be determined by their organizational framework, and that when economic goals are realized, citizens will lose their loyalties to their respective primordial sovereign countries as "super-ordinate cooperative goals" are stressed. Mitrany's thesis suggests that the development of collaboration in one sector will lead to collaboration in another; that is, functional cooperation in one section, resulting from felt need, will generate the need for functional collaboration in another sector. According to Robert Lieber (1973), "peaceful change would come not through a shift of national boundaries but by means of action taken across them."[8] Some states would not readily compromise their sovereignties except to transfer executive authority for specific ends, functional cooperation in areas of need among states therefore seemed the only workable alternative for promoting world peace. The neo-functionalists successfully improved on the functionalist strategy based essentially on the European integration process. The works of Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg, Phillip Schmitter and Stuart Scheingold are quite illuminating in this regard. Some neofuctionalists have likened the behaviour of an actor in a regional setting to that in a modern pluralist nation-states motivated by self-interest, and concluded that there is a continuum between economic integration and political union made possible through an automatic politicization. They argued that actors involved in an incremental process of decision-making, beginning with economic and social matters (welfare maximization) and gradually moving to the political sphere. They also prescribed "supranational agency" as a condition for "effective problem-solving," which slowly extends its authority so as "to progressively undermine the independence of the nation-states."[9] That political actors would "shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess on demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" is central assumption of the neo-factionalists.[10]

As a theory of regional integration, neofunctionalism identifies three causal factors that interact with one another. These are: (1) growing economic interdependence between nations, (2) organizational capacity to resolve disputes and build international legal regimes, and (3) supranational market rules that replace national regulatory regimes.[11] There is the sense in which early neofunctionalist theory reflects the idealist assumption that nations-states would pursue welfarist objectives through their commitment to political and market integration at a higher, supranational level. In his

8 Lieber 1973: 42.
9 Lindberg, Scheingold 1970: 6.
10 Haas 2004: 16.
11 Haas 1961; Sandholtz, Sweet 1997.

work, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Ernst Haas pointed at three mechanisms as the driving forces behind regional integration. These include positive spillover, the transfer of domestic allegiances and technocratic automaticity.[12]

There are two fundamental fallacies in the assumptions and prescriptions of the functionalists and neo-functionalists – the separability of 'Grosspolitik' from welfare issues and the potential of international organizations. That peace can be automatically achieved through economic and social internationalization raises the question whether states can be made to join in a functional sector before setting their outstanding political and security issues which divide them. Apart from the "priority fallacy," there is also the problem of ultimate transfer of loyalty and sovereignty from states to international organizations. One of the key justifications for the transfer of loyalty from the state to international organizations is the assumption that supranational agencies are better equipped to effectively and efficiently promote the interests of the people and states. However, judging from the operations of the universal and functionally specific international agencies, there are, to date, very few of such agencies that have moved very far in the direction of the neo-functionalist assumption that people are willing and capable of pressing their governments to transfer powers to international bodies.[13]

Although the theory of neofunctionalism has been modified and updated in a couple of recent studies which address some of the limitations of classical neo-functionalism.[14] These efforts have however focused essentially on European integration processes. The universalistic aspiration that the functionalist strategy could be implemented on a world-wide basis with no regard for the differences in the various regions of the world has been found to be deficient. Similarly, the failure to treat the world setting in which the regional integration takes place, and also recognizes the importance of exogenous factors as contributing variables constitute contradiction. In addition, the Europe-centeredness of the functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches make them almost irrelevant to integration process in the South. It was ironical however that in the early 1960s the majority of African leaders opted for gradualist functional cooperation based on the European model of regional integration. The quest for African unity was largely influenced by functionalist assumptions and propositions. Thus in May 1963 at Addis Ababa the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was signed.

12 Haas 2004.
13 Deutsch 1978: 210.
14 See for example: Sandholtz, Sweet 1998; Sweet, Sandholtz, Fligstein 2001.

Under the umbrella of the OAU independent African states declared their allegiance to the United Nations and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the African states and mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They also affirmed the need for solidarity and cooperation among African states. The signing of the OAU Charter can be seen as a demonstration of the preference of many African leaders for the gradualist strategy regarding regional integration.

> THE EUROPE-CENTEREDNESS OF THE FUNCTIONALIST AND NEO-FUNCTIONALIST APPROACHES MAKE THEM ALMOST IRRELEVANT TO INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE SOUTH

Federalism is a political and legal philosophy which adapts itself to all political contexts on both the municipal and the international level. Functionalism and federalism are two different strategies. However, their ultimate objectives are the same. Both seek to supersede the sovereign nation-state by peaceful means through an international organization that is better equipped to promote peace among nation-states.[15] The federalist approach seeks integration through a process of harnessing power whereby independent political units transfer certain powers to transnational bodies by treaty. In this way integration becomes a treaty-based linkage of sovereign or independent states for purpose of promoting economic or security interests. As an international integration theory federalism stresses the necessity for formally abolishing the sovereignty of a politically deficient nation-state by means of a dramatic constitutional act geared to eliminating the existing dispensation. In this way federalism recognizes and accepts nation-states as the basic unit in international system but seeks to overpower them by subordinating them to a supranational authority. This approach argues "that while common markets may flourish because of some men's grubby and greedy minds, such mundane arrangements will never lead to political union because that status demands that the pride and fury associated with nationalism be eliminated first."[16] Thus beyond functionalism and neo-functionalism, the federalist approach has potential capacity to overcome the contradictions associated with territorial nationalism that can hinder regional integration. For both the pluralists and federalists the question of integration "is not in the first instance an economic question but rather a question of politics, of power, and of responsiveness and control."[17]

15 Malley 1973.
16 Haas 1970: 629.
17 Chime 1977: 50.

Among the basic prerequisites central to the process and outcome of the federalist approach are the search for unity, and genuine respect for the autonomy and the legitimate interests of the participant entities. According to Carl Friedrich, an international federal order is an arrangement that "is sufficiently loose for its members to have separate and autonomous relations with other states and at the same time develop or maintain joint relations."[18] Thought of in this context, Carl Friedrich characterized the European Economic Community (now EU) as a model of international federalism; its members were able to conduct some aspects of their relations with the outside world as a single entity while still having the capacity to relate to the outside world in separate and individual capacity.[19] The federalist approach accords importance to supranational agencies as the vehicle through which a pattern of international cooperation is to be induced with the prospect of evolving into a political union.[20] Indeed the success of a federal arrangement depends to a large extent on the extent of power the bureaucracy wields.

The federalist approach to regional integration has been tested in Africa at different times. For instance in the 1940s, Kwame Nkrumah defined the concept of 'West African unity' as the means towards achieving a United States of Africa. However, Nkrumah's idea could not record much success because of the egocentric attitude of African leaders to their newly won independence. Besides, legacies of colonialism such as the reality of division along metropolitan linguistic lines (Anglophone and Francophone) constituted impediments in some respects. The influence of external pressures was very great on most of the new African states that no matter how hard Nkrumah tried to spread the gospel of pan-Africanism the responses were not encouraging. The experiments with international integration through federalism in other parts of Africa were also not so much of a success. The East African Federation never took off as a federation while the Central African Federation existed only for very brief but turbulent period.

In all the above cases and other instances in Africa, it was not so much the challenges of colonial heritage, dependency, lack of complementarity or a host of other secondary factors but the absence of political commitment to the goal of federalism itself that worked against federalist form of regional integration in Africa. Where short terms goals were the main motivations for inaugurating the union, once the short term goals were achieved, disintegration set in. The study by Claude Welch on unification attempts in West Africa points to an obvious relationship between the transition to independence and the likelihood of unification. The common interest in political independence brought the people closer and also encouraged them to link the goals of unification with that of independence. However, at the attainment of the goal of independence it became more and more difficult for the people and their leaders to make the commitments and sacrifices that go with unification.[21]

It has been said the "the dream of a federal Africa was sacrificed on the altar of pluralism"[22] at Addis Ababa in 1963 when the OAU Charter was signed and the majority of African leaders settled for the gradualist strategy for the promotion of African integration. As shown above other attempts at international federalism in Africa never resulted in any significant success. However, recent global developments and also events within the African continent suggest the need to revisit the discourse on the approaches to African integration and the strength and limitations of the federalist approach.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND QUEST FOR PEACE

The AU is the latest of Africa's broad regional integration schemes. By the close of the 1970s it had become evident that the OAU Charter needed some amendments to enable the Organization cope accurately with the challenges and the realities of the changing world. Consequently, in 1979 the Committee on the Review of the Charter was established, but the Committee was not able to formulate substantial amendments. However, for the OAU to continue to be relevant, the Charter was "amended" and augmented essentially through some ad hoc decisions of the Summit. Such include the Cairo Declaration Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, etc. Even at that, it was increasingly necessary for the Organization to work towards greater efficiency. Considering some provisions of the AEC, there was urgent need to integrate the political activities of the OAU with the provisions of the AEC Treaty on economic and development issues to avoid duplications. Thus the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999 called for the establishment of an African Union in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the OAU Charter and the provisions of the AEC Treaty. Following this, the Consultative Act of the African Union was adopted during the Lomé Summit of the OAU on 11 July 2000. At the 5th Extraordinary OAU/AEC Summit held in Sirte, Libya on 1-2 March 2001, a decision declaring the establishment of the

18 Friedrich 1968: 84-85.
19 Friedrich 1968: 85.
20 Carnell 1961: 17.
21 Claude 1966.
22 Chime 1977: 49.

African Union, based on the unanimous will of members States was adopted. According to the immediate timetable agreed at the 5th Extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya in March, the African Union came to into being at the 2002 OAU Summit, which took place in South Africa. Significant was what President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda said to justify the need for African Union: "What we actually need is to amalgamate the present 53 states of Africa into either one African Union or, at least, seven or so more viable states: West African Union, Congo, the East African Union, the Southern African Union, the Horn of Africa Union, the Maghreb Union with Egypt and Sudan."[23]

> THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AU MARKED THE BEGINNING OF A QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN AFRICAN INTEGRATION; ONE THAT SEEKS TO PROMOTE PAN-AFRICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION OVER AND ABOVE PSEUDO- NATIONALIST AND STATE-CENTRIC NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY

The objectives of the African Union strengthen the founding principles of the OAU Charter, but are more comprehensive in acknowledging the multi-faceted challenges confronting the continent, especially in the areas of peace and security, and socio-economic development and integration. The Union is intended to, among other things: accelerate political and socio-economic integration; promote common Africa positions; promote democratic institutions, popular participation and good governance; protect human rights; promote sustainable development and the integration of African economies; work to eradicate preventable diseases and promote good health. The Constitutive Act provides for a number of institutions to carry out the operations and activities of the AU. The main organs of the AU include the Assembly, the Executive Council, the PAP,[24] the African Court of Justice, the Commission, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, Specialized Technical Committees, and the Economic Social and Cultural Council. Also, in Article 19 of the Act of the AU a number of financial institutions are provided for. These include the African Central bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank. The AU has a number of special programmes to help facilitate its vision and quicken the realization of its goals. Such include the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Conference on Security Stability Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA).

23 Museveni 2001: 12.

24 Pan-African Parliament (Editor's note – JVdB)

The various organs and institutions of the AU have developed separately, and mostly in unhealthy competition with each other rather than working in collaboration in pursuit of the big picture of political and economic integration of Africa.The global setting for the renewed commitment to Pan-Africanism and also the inclination towards federalist approach to regional integration is one that is characterized by the demise of the territorial state in international relations, and also the growing desire for deeper integration in Africa. Also at the continental level, there is growing awareness about the effectiveness of regional integrative and cooperative schemes in the prevention and management of conflicts which has defeated the idea of 'non-interference clause' that almost crippled the OAU (the AU's predecessor). On the danger of 'non-interference' in the internal affairs of African states, Former President Mandela once said: "we (African leaders) must accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to intervene, when, behind those boundaries, people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny."[25] Also, Eboe Hutchful lends credence to Mandela's notion of "sovereignty as responsibility" noting that the "defence of democracy and proper governance" is indeed "appropriate grounds for intervention" in the "internal affairs of other states.[26] Indeed the establishment of the AU marked the beginning of a qualitative change in African integration; one that seeks to promote Pan-African regional integration over and above pseudo- nationalist and state-centric notion of sovereignty.

More than ever, the world today is experiencing a re-awakening of supranationalism. In response to the tension between these rising tides and nationalism, the EU came up with a workable hybrid model that balances 'inter-governmentalism' and 'supranationalism.' Inter-governmentalism represents platforms for interstate cooperation which puts less demands on states. In reality most international organizations exhibit the features of both supranationalism and inter-governmentalism. For example, the Council of the European Union, the primary decision-making organ of the EU consists of national ministers who primarily champion the agenda of their governments while they still remain part of the Council. On the other hand, the United Nations which is a model of intergovernmental organisation sometimes exercises supranational powers through its Security Council. It is this hybrid model that seems to be gaining prominence in the operations of most international and regional organizations as the states push for greater cooperation among themselves. African states that hitherto "held on to the idea of nation-state and national sovereignty appear to be on the path

25 Mandela 1998: 2.

26 Hutchful 1998: 1.

towards rejecting both." With "the resurgence of 'African consciousness' they are demonstrating renewed commitment to regional and continental institutions through numerous treaties in pursuit of regional integration.[27] Arguably the transformation of the Organization of African Union (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in some respects benefited from the paradigm shift in regional integration that favours the cohabitation of supranationalism and inter-governmentalism.

The Constitutive Act of the AU (CAAU), in its objectives, places premium on the promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa (Article 3 (f)). Also, enshrined in its principles are peaceful resolution of conflicts, the prohibition of the use of force or threats to use force, rights of intervention in the affairs of member states in case of "grave circumstances" related to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (Articles 4 (c), (f), and (h) respectively). The Acts provides that "the Mechanism shall maintain close working relations with the PAP in furtherance of peace, security and stability in Africa." The Protocol highlights specific areas of collaboration and cooperation between the PAP and the Peace and Security Council. One important area of cooperation is ensuring the PAP's access to important reports notably the annual report on the state of peace and security in the continent, and the report of the Peace and Security Council in order for the former to discharge its responsibilities relating to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. Also, the Chairperson of the Commission is required to take all steps to facilitate the exercise powers by the PAP as it relates to the objective of promoting peace, security and stability. The language of the Protocol that frames the relationship between the Peace and Security Council and the PAP is affirmative and obligatory. The former has no discretion on whether or not to relate with the Parliament. The Peace and Security Council has to relate with the PAP in very specific ways. The Protocol, in not so many words, puts the PAP in an oversight position on peace and security on the Continent. Whenever the PAP requests for report from the Council, the latter is under obligation to provide it. Even if the PAP does not request reports, the Chairperson of the Commission is under obligation to present annual reports to the Parliament on the state of peace and security on the continent.[28]

The existing legal and political relationships among the key AU institutions are not well-defined which seems to pose some challenges. Whereas the African leaders fast tracked the process that culminated in the

27 Oppong 2011: 1.

28 See Article 18 (1-3) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

birth of AU, there was no evidence that the African peoples in their different social categories were involved. Only "few African leaders chose to open the subject of a new union for public discussion within their countries."[29] A survey conducted in 15 African countries between 2002 and 2003 shows that only 49 per cent of the respondents have heard of continental bodies like the African Union (even when referred to in the questionnaire by its former name, the OAU or even the regional economic community in their region namely SADC, EAC and ECOWAS. [30]

The world is witnessing continued movement toward broader and deeper integration among nation-states in various regions of the world, and also that non-states and sub-national actors are increasingly relevant in areas that were previous the domain of the nation-state, including the security and economic realms. At the continental level, historical and contemporary developments seem to support increased African integration. Recent trends and developments show many African countries to be on the side of increased commitment to regional cooperation and integration. We note in particular the untiring efforts of these countries as well as the renewed interest of the political elites in Pan-Africanism, which culminated first in the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) and lately the inauguration of AU. The central question however is how African states, working with the African Union (AU) with supranational powers, are likely to adapt to these new realities that characterized the Third Millennium. Also, what are the prospects for success given that African states have been generally portrayed as being emotionally attached to sovereignty and therefore less disposed towards supporting a supranational body?

Contrary to the view that Africans are emotionally attached to sovereignty and that this may work against supranationalism, the new conception of African integration tends to accord much to the AU Authority. The situation has changed since the period after the independence when it was fashionable to emphasize sovereignty and territorial nationalism. As indicated above the incorporation of the concept of supranationality into the AEC encouraged other integrative arrangements to buy into the concept and practice of supranationalism. Arguably the establishment of the African Union in 2002 and some of the follow-up activities (including the recent transformation of the AU Commission into African Authority) have further consolidated the institutionalization of supranationalism in the African integration process.

29 Packer, Rukare 2002: 365.

30 Afrobarometer 2003.

At the continental level, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) dominated the scene for over three decades with a mandate to resolve conflicts. While the "regionalist" approach of the OAU was quite appreciated, it lacked the political courage and institutional capacity for managing conflicts. Although the OAU Charter provided for the organization to settle African disputes and conflicts, its performance in this area was hardly impressive. The regionalist approach of the OAU found easy accommodation within the assumptions of the idealist school. Apart from lacking the political courage, the institutional capacity of the OAU for managing conflicts was largely inadequate. Indeed, its role was later appropriated by sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Clearly, by the end of the Cold War the OAU had still not emerged as a regional organization with sufficient clout to manage African conflicts. This, coupled with other developments in the post-Cold-War period, necessitated a rethinking among scholars and policy makers on what should be the role of regional organizations in the promotion of peace and development in Africa. The sub-regional schemes quickly responded as was demonstrated in the case of the intervention of ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis.

After operating the Treaty Establishing the ECOWAS (1975) for almost a period of two decades, the Treaty was found to be inadequate in some critical areas such as political cooperation, and regional peace and security. Other areas of inadequacy include the weak binding effect of the decisions of the Authority and the Council, and the near absence of supranational power within ECOWAS as a regional organization. Consequently, the Committee of Eminent Persons to Review the ECOWAS Treaty was set up to consider the legislative powers of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, the financing of the budgets of the Community institutions; and the decision making procedures of the Authority and the Council of Ministers. The Committee in its deliberations identified four issues: institutional matters; political cooperation, regional peace and security, financing of regional integration efforts, and available options for cooperation and regional economic integration. The Revised Treaty of ECOWAS was adopted by the Heads of State in July 1993. Today ECOWAS is more associated with regional security in West Africa, and it has done considerably very well in the areas of ensuring regional peace and security as well as promoting democracy and good governance in the sub-region. Interestingly this has earned ECOWAS a measure of international recognition. Since its intervention in the Liberia crisis, ECOWAS has successfully intervened in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and most recently Mali.

The development of a supranational security mechanism for conflict management and peace-keeping has progressed far more in West Africa under the Revised Treaty. ECOWAS has scaled up its normative instruments and institutional arrangements to anticipate and confront challenges to peace and security in the region, particularly with regard to conflicts and political governance. The security mechanism of ECOWAS consists of a Mediation and Security Council, a Defence and Security Commission, and a Council of Elders. The Mediation and Security Council is made up of ten members, and decisions are made by a two-thirds majority of six members. It is important to note that the security mechanism of ECOWAS recognises the role of the civil society in peace process and accords it the opportunity to contribute to the organisation's early warning system mechanism. In 2008 an ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was adopted to guide the organisation's preventive diplomacy, which has further been strengthened by the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, with the provision on zero-tolerance for ascension to power through unconstitutional means. There is an ECOWAS peace keeping mission in Guinea Bissau, ECOMIB. Also, ECOWAS is implementing a multi-million dollar defence and security sector reform programme in the country as part of the efforts to restore peace and democracy in the country. The recent intervention of ECOWAS in the Malian crisis benefitted from the efficiency of the ECOWAS institutions that came with the on-going reforms. The success of the intervention by ECOWAS paved the way for the transformation of the African-led International Support Mission into the UN mission.

Arguably, the success story in the area of conflict management and peace keeping can be linked to the commitment of the ECOWAS to good governance and democratization. It suffices to say that ECOWAS worked closely with the African Union and the United Nations to restore order and legality in the member states Guinea, Niger and Ivory Coast. Similarly, the same principles of ECOWAS with respect to democracy and good governance guided the stand it took on the presidential elections in Guinea, Niger, Benin, and Nigeria. The concern about the implications of the 'Boko Haram' for regional security in West Africa has been expressed by ECOWAS at different levels. The ECOWAS parliament discussed the issue in one of its plenary sessions, noting that the ECOWAS and other countries within the region were already finding ways of assisting Nigeria.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has a model of regional collective security that is almost similar to that of ECOWAS. Since the end of the apartheid era, SADC has undergone a radical realignment, with South Africa becoming its de facto leader rather than its primary

target. SADC's 1992 Treaty states clearly that the consolidation, defence, and maintenance of democracy, peace, security and stability is one of the main objectives of the organization. As in the case of Nigeria in ECOWAS/ ECOMOG, having South Africa on board has contributed to the effectiveness of SADC's security and economic functions. SADC's conflict management strategy is based on the mandate of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDS), the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, and other relevant UN and AU protocols and guidelines.

The OPDS and the SADC Troika are required to, among others, prevent, manage and resolve "inter and intra-state conflicts, by peaceful means employing inter alia, preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, and mediation." But the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation stresses the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aggression while the SIPO refers to mediation as a strategic activity not open to International Cooperation Partners (ICPs) funding. Expectedly these restrictions have implications for SADC's performance in conflict management as in the cases of Zimbabwe and Madagascar. The SADC Organ was established in 1996 and it was envisaged that it would become the institutional framework within which SADC countries would coordinate their policies and activities in the areas of politics, defence and security. However, disagreement among members over different interpretations of certain sections of the charter has inhibited the operations of the Organ. Somehow the SADC has been able to record some success in political mediation in the Comoros, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The organization is set to establish Mediation Unit to enhance its capacity for mediation, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy within the SADC region.

These accomplishments notwithstanding, the dream of regional security community is still far from being realised in the SADC region. There are other issues that make cooperation among the member states of SADC more difficult. One of such is the border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania. The SADC Treaty (Article 9) empowers the SADC Tribunal to adjudicate on inter-state disputes. The Tribunal is however suspended, and in its absence a SADC mediation process was instituted through the Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government whose performance has not come through as very impressive. These seemingly poor performance indicators of SADC's ability to manage its internal affairs effectively have not inspired confidence in many as to its ability to ensure peace and stability in the southern Africa. The perception of SADC as being biased regarding

Zimbabwe, following the election, which SADC endorsed as 'credible' and 'peaceful.' Also, SADC faces some constraints which include: the absence of an effective Regional Early Warning System (REWS), poor political will and courage, weakness of the main institutions (especially the Organ's secretariat which is subordinate to the Organ Troika and cannot exercise control over member states), and lack of a strong financial base for mediation efforts. Also, while the SADC Standby Force is sufficiently adequate for military operations, it's generally lacking in capacities for managing humanitarian crises. Similarly, SADC does not have a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction programme that is necessary for sustainable peace in the region.

> "THE DREAM OF REGIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY IS STILL FAR FROM BEING REALISED IN THE SADC REGION

The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has begun to assert a role for itself in the resolution of sub-regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. IGAD is a sub-regional organization that has the primary task of coordinating some regional resource issues. It was formed in 1986 and initially known as Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Its membership now consists of six countries that include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. It was in March 1996 that the Heads of IGAD amended the organization's charter to cover political and economic issues, including conflict resolution. With respect to conflict management, the periodic summits of IGAD have provided the necessary forum for heads of state to meet and discuss conflict issues among other things. For example at the 1986 IGAD summit the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia had the opportunity to initiate talks that eventually led to détente and the demilitarization of their borders[31]. Because of perceived threats from conflicts in Somalia and Sudan security issues received prompt attention in the agenda of IGAD, especially in the early 1990s. Although its efforts were not quite successful, IGAD mediated in the civil war in Sudan in September 1993, and made some headway in 1994. IGAD resumed its role in 1997 but not very much has been accomplished beyond keeping the process going. Recently, IGAD pressurized the two armed factions in South Sudan to begin talks towards peaceful resolution of the recent outbreak of violent conflicts.

The Horn of Africa is bedevilled by serious inter- and intra-state conflicts. All the countries in IGAD have had significant internal security

31 Deng 1996: 137

problems. For example, Sudan has been engulfed in conflict for more than three decades. The newly independent South Sudan is almost torn apart due to inter-ethnic conflicts. With pressures from the international community IGAD is according priority to the issue of peace and security. IGAD operates its mandate on the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts essentially through the means of political dialogue and cooperation with the AU. In this regard it has made some efforts to deal with the pro-long conflict in Somalia. For example, member states were ready to amend the mandate of IGAD which did not permit sending troops to remember states in order to be able to organized peace keeping missions. One of the challenges is the sensitivity of members about the issue of sovereignty and internal affairs. There is also the problem of unhealthy rivalry and competition between members state of IGAD. Neither Sudan nor Ethiopia has demonstrated the actual or potential attributes of a "core state" to assume leadership responsibility within IGAD. In addition, IGAD is confronted with the problem of lack of funds. None of the member state is rich enough to provide support in the sense that Nigeria supported ECOMOG operations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Hence, the accomplishments of IGAD have remained quite marginal compared with either ECOWAS or even SADC.

Apart from ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, there are a handful of less-known sub-regional initiatives on conflict prevention and management operating in Africa. These include the ECCAS, Arab Maghreb Union and the little-known community of Sahelian-Saharan states that once mooted the idea of creating an intervention force to help settle the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It is interesting to note that the recently revived East African Community (EAC) has bounced back to life giving due consideration to matters of regional security and peace. In June 1998, the three EAC member states - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - together with the US undertook their first joint peacekeeping exercise. In Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), under the guardian of the AU and the support of the EU, is promoting political and security cooperation in the sub-region. Although its members have signed some relevant treaties and protocols such as the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Afrique Centrale, COPAX), however, ECCAS still has no comprehensive policy framework for ensuring regional peace and security. The problem of poor internal governance is very much associated with ECCAS coupled with its weak financial based that makes it to be excessively dependent on external assistance and support. For example, recently responsibility for the African peacekeeping force in the Central African Republic (MISCA) was officially transferred from the ECCAS to the AU primarily because under ECCAS the

force lacked both the capacity and credibility required to mediate effectively in conflicts.

In West Africa the Accord de Non-Aggression et d'Assistance en Matière de Défense (ANAD) was signed in June 1977 by Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, and Togo. Benin and Guinea Conakry were granted observer status at the meetings of the organization. ANAD's main objective at its creation was to promote security and stability in order to enhance economic development. It was not a supranational body, and neither did it develop any military policy. It stated quite clearly that it was a defensive alliance, and that any attack on any member would be interpreted as an attack on the entire alliance.[32] Its mode of operation includes dialogue and negotiation to resolve conflict among members, and the use of a peace intervention force should the former fail. Also, it stipulated that an external attack against a member state from outside would entail the following courses of action: firstly, a search for a diplomatic solution, to be followed by an imposition of sanctions short of the use of force, and finally, as a last resort, the use of armed force to counter and reverse the aggression. Although it was originally conceived as a non-aggression and mutual defence pact, but ANAD has today transcended the initial status of sub-regional security to include areas of high level integration such as common policy formulation and co-operation on broader issues of human security.

Noticeably where sub-regional mechanisms for conflict management have recorded appreciable success like in the case of ECOWAS/ECOMOG in West Africa, it is arguably the results of paying regard to issues of good governance and democratization. Amadu Sesay argues that the sub-regional groupings that have enjoyed relative success stress the central role of democratization and good governance in their programmes of conflict management and resolution.[33] Some of the principles espoused the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States and other major declarations on the various conflicts in West Africa underline the notion that democratization coupled with responsive and responsible governance are the most effective conflict management tools. In contrast, where it has been difficult to get members of sub-regional schemes to agree to operate sub-regional conflict management mechanisms with due consideration to issues of good governance and democracy, the returns on investment on collective security have been rather low. The SADC in some respects illustrates a case of lack of consensus among member states on how to deal with the issues of human rights, democratization and good governance.

32 Alao 2000.
33 Sesay 2002.

While sub-regional groupings in Africa continue to make contributions towards peace and development through a regional security approach, the AU has also scaled up its interventions towards the promotion of regional peace and stability on the continent. Its main mechanism for this is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), that includes the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), a Continental Early Warning System, an enhanced mediation capacity, an African Stand-by Force (ASF), and a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework. At the inaugural AU summit in 2002, it was agreed that a Peace and Security Council (PSC) be established with the responsibility of preventing, managing, and revolving conflicts in Africa. The PSC has been established and efforts are being made by African leaders to ensure that the PSC is structured in a way that guarantees its effectiveness. Unlike the OAU mechanism, the AU has the "right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the PSC in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity." Since 2004 when it was established the PSC has made significant progress leveraging benefits from the evolving cooperation between the AU and UN especially in the area of information sharing. This has contributed towards the success of the mission in Somalia, particularly the joint assessment on the African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It has not been a success all the way, though. Cooperation between the UN and AU has not worked as well in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). Other problems confronting the PSC include lack of funds, and the absence of definite status in relation to sub-regional organizations.

GLOBAL PRESSURES AND OPPORTUNITIES

External actors have always played a prominent role in both the economy and politics of Africa because of the importance of the region to the geostrategic interests of the major international actors, which include the access to resources, oil and other strategic minerals. In the recent times anti-terrorism has been added to the motives for the growing interests in Africa, especially in the West. This logic provides the general context for the interests of some members of the international community providing support in order to manage African conflicts. However, it is of importance to note seeming inconsistencies in the reactions and responses of some of the external actors. For example, how does one reconcile the prompt reactions to revolts and uprising in Libya with the silence of Washington and Brussels over the revolt against Ben Ali of Tunisia?

Arguably, the United States broadly has remained committed to its strategic interests in Middle East and North Africa. Thus its responses have been based largely on its assessment of individual events vis-à-vis its national interests. However, in the case of Libya it would appear that Washington was committed to an agenda for regime change given the extent of support it gave to the Transitional National Council.[34] Also, the United States initially supported the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party of Egypt possibly in order to advance one of its strategic interests – the 'war on terror', which the Brotherhood was perceived to be willing to help prosecute in the Arab world. Similarly, the response of France to the conflicts in Ivory Coast, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo and most recently the Central African Republic need to be properly studied. Could it be that France is now more concerned about the need to regain its lost status and influence in Africa?

Recently the United States announced that it has budgeted up to $101 million to help the African forces and France to re-establish security in the Central African Republic. The announcement came after the initial promise to set aside $40 million for the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) in November 2013. Other forms of US assistance consist of military aid for foreign troops stationed in the CAR and $15 million in humanitarian aid. Why this investment to support regional peace initiatives in CAR? Also, China's participation in peacekeeping and peace building operations in the continent is provoking concerns in some circles where China is seen as a mere opportunist. Some may argue that China's economic activities in Africa are contributing to favourable conditions for violent conflicts. For example, the same China that provided a large contingent of peacekeeping troops to Liberia was also perpetuating and sustaining the rule of Charles Taylor by its involvement in their illicit buying of timber. Also, China's increasing involvement as a supplier of arms to Africa remains a source of concern.

Examples of EU assistance towards peace and security in Africa include the support of the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur, the CEMAC mission in the Central African Republic, and the institutional capacity building programme for the AU. In addition to building the capacity of African institutions, the EU is supporting direct international intervention within the framework the EU Africa strategy. Other areas of EU security

34 Libya's Transitional National Council has a sizeable number of its members from the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The Brotherhood was comfortably set to play a significant role in the new government in Libya. The Brotherhood received substantial support from the US allies in the Arab world.

engagements in Africa within the context of the EU Africa Strategy include the police mission (EUPOL) and security sector reform programme. As it is generally with external support and assistance, recipient's choice and preference come after the donor's priorities and considerations. Most of the funding of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) under the AU-EU partnership has been carried out selectively under the African Peace Facility (APF) with concentration on military activities of PSOs through the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Faced with the challenge of inadequate resources, selective funding makes it difficult for other components of the assistance programme (like the institutional development of the APSA); so they suffer neglect. Also, there are the challenges of delay and late response, in part due to over-bureaucratization of processes and procedures. While the EU's assistance demonstrates commitment to the promotion of peace and security on the continent, in a sense it can be said that this is a response to the challenge of global insecurity, of which African peace and security challenges constitute a significant part.

On the whole there is a new global consensus on the relevance of regional integration to African peace and development. The dominant idea, which is rooted in contemporary political economy thought, is that regional integration is still a very effective means of promoting the goals of self-reliance, peace and development. The most recent African plan for economic development is the NEPAD, and a regional approach to development is the key element through which many of the expected results are to be accomplished. NEPAD among other things is seeking to define regional integration in a way that it will transcend the economic sphere to include other aspects of development. It is interesting to note that many regional and sub-regional schemes are buying fast into this new conceptualization of regional integration. However, as this goes on, African development is increasingly susceptible to global pressures; especially those associated with neo-liberalism such as the new global trade regimes (notably the US's African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), EU-sponsored Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and other elements of economic globalization).

There is also a new global crusade around the themes of 'democratization,' 'good governance,' and 'human rights,' and the global North has emerged as the undisputed vanguard of this crusade since the end of the Cold War. The consequences for the countries from the global South, especially those that depend on external assistance and trade concessions is 'aid fatigue' in the face of tough 'conditionalities,' which in most cases require aid seekers to compulsorily adhere to liberal democratic principles in the least. The EU, since the late 1980s, has become prominently associated with the

promotion of human rights and liberal democratic values, and this in many respects has affected the orientation of its relationship with its partners in the South. For example: the political dimension of development cooperation has gained much prominence in its partnership relationships. This has been demonstrated with the European Union-Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (EU-ACP) Conventions, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), and lately the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership under which the EU is supporting some African development initiatives.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregone discussion has demonstrated the strong link between conflict and development, and its centrality to the discourses on regional approaches to peace in Africa. African leaders themselves have come to see peace and development as going hand in hand. This was forcefully stated by the founders of NEPAD in 2001, which identify peace as one of the two prerequisites for development. Also, international partners in Africa are fast placing their resources at the disposal of African regional and sub-regional organizations to promote a regionalist approach to development and collective security in Africa. The G8 Africa Action Plan was adopted in Kananaskis, Canada in 2002. It set out comprehensive G8 commitments with focus on peace support operations in Africa. The international community has a key-role to play in supporting these African-led efforts. Also, within the framework of the EU Strategy for Africa, the EU members are committed to helping with the development of the ASF through training, by providing advisory, technical, planning, financial and logistic support and, among other things, by continuing to implement the European Security and Defence Action Plan in support of peace and security in Africa. The EU has also set up a Peace Facility for Africa.

There is a growing support for the pursuit of peace and development in Africa through regional approaches. However, despite some success stories, conflict management mechanisms of regional organizations in Africa are still developing. While at the continental level, efforts are present to ensure adequate institutional frameworks for some of the new initiatives; at the sub-regional levels established institutional frameworks and structures are absent. Because of the absence of institutionalized structures for conflict management, conflict resolution initiatives have mostly taken ad hoc forms. The SADC best illustrates this limitation. It lacks integrated systems, processes and methods to deal with issues such as human rights and the advancement of democracy and good governance. The lack of consensus among SADC

member states on "how the Organ should relate to the SADC Summit," coupled with the lack of "the requisite political will and institutional capacity" has not helped SADC to evolve into regional security community.[35] Also, the ideological division among member states has continued to hamper the work of the Organ.[36] For example: While the group comprising of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia are disposed towards military solutions to conflict, another group made up of South Africa, Mozambique and to some extent Zambia are in support of the principles and objectives of the SADC Organ. Also, the absence of effective early warning systems and risk assessment capacities in many of the sub-regional and regional security arrangements in Africa in turn makes them considerably weak in conflict prevention.

Despite their obvious shortcomings, regional organizations still largely represent primary units of security and conflict management for the African continent. Both the United Nations and other major actors in the international community have given explicit approval to the increased engagement of regional organizations in conflict management. Also, it is now clear to African states themselves that they have to rely less on the generosity of the North to manage African conflicts. Both the United Nations and other major actors in the international community have given explicit approval to increase engagement of sub-regional organization with conflict management. And AU members have gone ahead to establish the African Standby Force (ASF) in response to developments and changes in the peacekeeping environment.

Finally, further research, to identify and define issues in the link between African development and collective security more precisely is required. Therefore in-depth studies of the political economy of African conflicts should be encouraged and supported by critical stakeholders within and outside continental Africa. Such initiatives should necessarily consider the importance of scientific research, which entails data and information gathering, analyses and re-analyses. For example, while the impacts of civil wars in Africa are becoming common research subjects, the role of the business community, organized private sectors, and other components of the civil society are frequently un-documented. Also, there is need to generate a lot of information to determine the logics and interests of the external actors and their suitability for interventions in African conflicts. Other issues for in-depth research include the influence of the external environment on African conflicts.

35 Dieter, Lamb, Melber 2001: 65.

36 Dieter, Lamb, Melber 2001: 65.

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